We give a unified treatment of the convergence of random series and the rate of convergence of strong law of large numbers in the framework of game-theoretic probability of Shafer and Vovk [24] . We consider games with the quadratic hedge as well as more general weaker hedges. The latter corresponds to existence of an absolute moment of order smaller than two in the measure-theoretic framework. We prove some precise relations between the convergence of centered random series and the convergence of the series of prices of the hedges. When interpreted in measure-theoretic framework, these results characterize convergence of a martingale in terms of convergence of the series of conditional absolute moments. In order to prove these results we derive some fundamental results on deterministic strategies of Reality, who is a player in a protocol of game-theoretic probability. It is of particular interest, since Reality's strategies do not have any counterparts in measure-theoretic framework, ant yet they can be used to prove results which can be interpreted in measure-theoretic framework.
Introduction
In standard textbooks on measure-theoretic probability, the strong law of large numbers (SLLN) is proved using Kronecker's lemma. As a precondition for Kronecker's lemma, the convergence of a random series is usually stated in the form of three-series theorem. Game-theoretic counterpart in Section 4.2 of Shafer and Vovk ([24] ) basically follows the same line of argument. However game-theoretic forms of various conditions for convergence of random series have not been studied in detail. Indeed, game-theoretic counterparts of the standard three-series theorem have to be stated more carefully than in the measuretheoretic setting in several respects, such as the treatment of truncation of random variables and the martingale nature of game-theoretic framework. In particular we need to take into account Gilat's counter example ( [7] , see also [2] , [3] ) to three-series theorem for martingales.
In this paper we give a unified game-theoretic treatment of convergence of random series and the rate of convergence of SLLN. We consider games with the quadratic hedge. For an i.i.d. case in the terminology of measure-theoretic probability, the law of the iterated logarithm (LIL) gives the precise rate. In game-theoretic probability which corresponds to a non-identical case, the rate of convergence may be slower. We give the precise rate in the game-theoretic framework.
We also consider games with more general weaker hedges. MarcinkiewiczZygmund strong law ( [15] , [8] , [13] ) suggests that the rate of convergence of random series and SLLN should depend on the existence of moments. In Section 5 we will show that the rate is determined by the inverse function of the hedge function.
In order to derive results on convergence of random series, we study some topics. One topic is the set of convergence of a martingale. If a capital process is required to be non-negative, the convergence theorem for a non-negative capital process stated in [24] is sufficient. However it is useful to consider the set of convergence for an arbitrary capital process which may be negative.
Another topic is deterministic strategies of Reality. We propose a notion called "compliance" concerning deterministic strategies of Reality and prove some results on them. In [24] , Reality's strategy is only briefly discussed. Furthermore only randomized strategies of Reality are considered in Section 4.3 of [24] and Section 7 of [13] . Our deterministic strategies of Reality can be understood as "derandomizations" of the randomized strategies in [24] and [13] . It is of interest that deterministic strategies of Reality, which do not have any counterparts in measure-theoretic probability, can be used to prove results which can be interpreted in measure-theoretic probability.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we consider sets of convergence in the bounded forecasting game and establish preliminary results on the implication of the convergence of a random series to the convergence of the series of prices for Reality's moves. We also treat the coin-tossing game as a special case of the bounded forecasting game. In Section 3 we consider bounded forecasting game with quadratic hedge and prove various results on convergence of random series. In Section 4 we study the rate of convergence of SLLN in unbounded forecasting game with quadratic hedge and in Section 5 we generalize our results to games with more general weaker hedges. We end the paper with some discussion on further topics in Section 6.
Preliminary results for bounded forecasting game and the coin-tossing game
We define the capital process K P = {K P n } n≥0 for a given strategy P recursively by K P 0 = 0 and K P n = K P n−1 + P n (m 1 , x 1 , . . . , m n−1 , x n−1 , m n )(x n − m n ), n ≥ 1. K P n is the cumulative payoff to Skeptic up to round n under the strategy P (without the initial capital K 0 = D). With our definition, K P 0 ≡ 0 is distinguished from the initial capital K 0 = D announced by Skeptic. We call a sequence of real-valued functions S n (m 1 , x 1 , . . . , x n , m n ) of m 1 , x 1 , . . . , m n , x n , n ≥ 0, a capital process if S n = K P n for some strategy P. An infinite sequence ξ = (m 1 , x 1 , m 2 , x 2 , . . . ) of moves of Forecaster and Reality is called a path. Define the sample space Ξ = {ξ = (m 1 , x 1 , m 2 , x 2 , . . . ) | m n , x n ∈ [−C, C], ∀n ≥ 1} as the set of paths. We regard K P and P as functions of ξ. They are denoted by K P n (ξ) and P n (ξ), which actually depend only on prefixes of ξ of length 2n and 2n − 1, respectively.
Any subset E of Ξ is called an event. We say that Skeptic can force E if there exists a strategy P of Skeptic, such that
and ξ ∈ E ⇒ lim sup n K P n (ξ) = ∞.
In this paper we do not make the distinction between forcing (lim n K P n = ∞) and weak forcing (lim sup n K P n = ∞) in view of Lemma 3.1 of [24] . A strategy P satisfying (1) is called prudent, i.e., if Skeptic observes his collateral using P with the initial capital K 0 = 1.
For two events E 1 , E 2 ⊂ Ξ, the event E 1 ⇒ E 2 stands for E C 1 ∪ E 2 , where E C 1 is the complement of E 1 . E 1 ⇔ E 2 stands for both implications:
where ∆ denotes the symmetric difference. Note that E 1 ⇔ E 2 and E
are the same as a subset of Ξ. In view of Lemma 3.1 of [24] , Skeptic can force E 1 ⇔ E 2 if and only if Skeptic can force both E 1 ⇒ E 2 and E 2 ⇒ E 1 .
A set of convergence
Martingale convergence theorems in measure-theoretic probability state that the limit of a martingale exists and is finite almost surely if the martingale is bounded in L 1 . In Section VII.5 of [27] the set of convergence was studied when the condition is not satisfied.
Game-theoretic probability also has convergence theorems. If a capital process is required to be non-negative, the convergence theorem holds. However it is useful to consider a strategy whose capital process may be negative in order to construct a strategy whose capital process is non-negative as we will do later. Then we will prove a game-theoretic version of a simple case of results in [27] . The results are used in a later section.
Let P be a strategy of Skeptic. Denote the minimum possible gain L n = L n (m 1 , x 1 , . . . , m n−1 , x n−1 , m n ) to Skeptic at the round n (after he knows Forecaster's move m n ) under P by
For D > 0, we define the stopping time τ
may be negative:
As usual τ D P = +∞ if the set on the right-hand side is empty. The truncation P D of P at the loss −D is defined as
Note that starting with the initial capital of D > 0, Skeptic observes his collateral duty by employing
is always nonnegative. We now prove the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1. Let P be any strategy in the bounded forecasting game. Let B P denote the event
Skeptic can force
By "convergence in R" we mean that lim n K P n exists and is finite. In later statements we will omit "in R" for simplicity. Proposition 2.1 means that given any strategy P, there exists another prudent strategy Q of Skeptic, such that
Proof. Note that the convergence or divergence of K P n is classified into the following five exclusive cases:
According to this classification, the sample space Ξ is partitioned into five subsets E P 1 , . . . , E P 5 . By Lemma 3.2 of [24] , it suffices to construct a prudent strategy Q of Skeptic for each of the cases E
We consider the case (iii) in detail. As noted above, for each D > 0, D+K P D n is always nonnegative. Consider dividing the initial capital of 1 into countably infinite accounts with initial capitals 1/2 + 1/4 + · · · = 1. For the D-th account with the initial capital of 1/2 D , we apply the strategy P D /(D2 D ). The resulting combined strategy Q is written as
Then the capital process of Q is written as
and hence Q is prudent. Now for each ξ ∈ B P ∩E 3 , there exist positive constants
and
This proves the case of (iii). The case (iv) is proved by the symmetry of the bounded forecasting protocol, i.e. by considering −P instead of P.
Finally (ii) can be proved by the standard argument involving Doob's upcrossing lemma (see Lemma 4.5 of [24] ). Note that Lemma 4.5 of [24] is for the case of prudent P. In our case, P is not necessarily prudent. However again combining truncations P D , D = 1, 2, . . . , with the argument of upcrossing lemma, we can construct a prudent Q such that lim sup n K Q n (ξ) = ∞ for each ξ ∈ B P ∩ E 2 . This proves the proposition.
We call a strategy P uniformly cautious if sup ξ∈Ξ,n≥1
For uniformly cautious P, B P = Ξ. Therefore if P is uniformly cautious, then Skeptic can force the right-hand side of (3). The reason for considering B P in (2) and uniformly cautious strategies is that they eliminate doubling type strategies.
Using Proposition 2.1 we can prove the following result, which is a generalization of results in Section 2.2.2 of [10] . We separate the sums in Y n as Y n = n k=1 x k − n k=1 m k and restrict relevant events to the particular event E 0 = { n x n converges}. Then clearly Skeptic can force (4) . (5) is proved similarly, by switching the roles of x n and m n .
Some applications
Consider the multi-dimensional bounded forecasting game (cf. [14] ) defined as follows. Reality's move space is a compact set X of R d . Forecaster's move space is the convex hull co(X ) of X and Skeptic's move space is R d . Denote the moves by Forecaster, Skeptic and Reality by µ n , m n and χ n , respectively. The payoff to Skeptic is m n · (χ n − µ n ), where "·" denotes the standard inner product in R d . The protocol of the multi-dimensional bounded forecasting game is written as follows.
Multi-dimensional Bounded Forecasting Game
Parameter: a compact region X ⊂ R Forecaster announces µ n ∈ coX . Skeptic announces m n ∈ R d . Reality announces χ n ∈ X .
Collateral Duties: Skeptic must keep K n non-negative. Reality must keep K n from tending to infinity.
It is easily seen that Proposition 2.1 holds in the multi-dimensional bounded forecasting game.
We now consider the coin-tossing game and give a game-theoretic probability version of Lévy's extension of Borel-Cantelli lemma. The protocol of the cointossing game is written as follows.
Coin-tossing game
Protocol:
Reality announces x n ∈ {0, 1}.
We have the following. 
Coin-tossing game is a special case of the bounded forecasting game (with C = D = 1), in such a way that the move space of Reality is restricted to {0, 1} and the move space of Forecaster is restricted to [0, 1] by coherence. Therefore, if Skeptic can force an event E in the bounded forecasting game, then Skeptic can force E in the coin-tossing game. In the coin-tossing game, n x n and n p n are non-negative series and they either converge to finite values or diverge to +∞. Therefore the case of two-sided unbounded oscillation on the right-hand side of (4) and (5) is impossible, which implies that Skeptic can force (6).
Lévy's extension of Borel-Cantelli lemma in measure-theoretic probability is usually stated as follows (cf. Theorem 12.15 of [31] ).
Proposition 2.5. Let X n , n = 1, 2, . . . , be a sequence of 0-1 random variables adapted to filtration {F n }. Let p n = E(X n | F n−1 ). Then almost surely
If we weaken (ii) to n p n = ∞ ⇒ n x n = ∞, then the measure-theoretic extension looks similar to Theorem 2.3. However there are some basic differences. In our setting, p n 's are only "prequentially" (eg. [30] ) announced by Forecaster and there is no need to specify the full probability measure on x n , n = 1, 2, . . . . Also, in measure-theoretic framework the null set, where these implications do not hold, may depend on the underlying probability measure. On the other hand, in the game-theoretic setting, we have constructed an explicit strategy Q forcing (6) and the behavior of its capital process K Q on the symmetric difference of two sets in (6) is explicitly understood. Furthermore in Proposition 4.8 of Section 4 we will strengthen the rate of convergence in (ii).
Bounded forecasting game with quadratic hedge
The standard measure-theoretic three-series theorem involves truncation of random variables and their means and variances. In considering game-theoretic counterpart of the standard setup, we here consider the simple case that the truncation is given before the game, i.e. we consider a variant of bounded forecasting game. In addition we assume that the quadratic hedge is available to Skeptic. From now on for simplicity we assume K 0 = 1. The protocol for this section is written as follows.
Bounded Forecasting with Quadratic Hedge (BFQH)
Parameter: C > 0 Players: Forecaster, Skeptic, Reality Protocol:
In this protocol the following theorem holds.
Before giving a proof of this theorem, we discuss some features of the theorem and the protocol BFQH.
The implication " n v n < ∞ ⇒ n (x n − m n ) converges" holds even for the case of C = +∞, but the the converse implication does not hold for C = +∞, as shown in Lemma 4.3 below. Therefore the main point of Theorem 3.1 is that Skeptic can force the equivalence of both sides in the case 0 < C < +∞.
In BFQH the ranges of V n and v n are different from both the bounded forecasting game in Section 3.1 of [24] and the unbounded forecasting game in Section 4.1 of [24] . First, we allow V n to be negative. In the usual unbounded protocol, if Skeptic announces negative V n then it violates his collateral duty because K n → −∞ as x n → ∞. However this does not happen in the above protocol because |x n | ≤ C is bounded. Second, we restrict
n ] for the game to be coherent. For example, consider the case m n = 0,
More precisely we should restrict m n and v n such that
2 dp n (
for some probability measure
n ] it is easily checked that (7) holds for the two-point measure
where a n = m n + (−C − m n )
BFQH can be regarded as a variant of the two-dimensional bounded forecasting game in Section 2.3 with an additional restriction at each round to Reality. In the multi-dimensional bounded forecasting game let
2 ). Also at each round of the game put an additional restriction to Reality's move space depending on Forecaster's move as
Since the restriction is advantageous to Skeptic, Proposition 2.1 holds for BFQH. Now we give a proof of Theorem 3.1. We use the notation
Proof of Theorem 3.1. (⇒) Consider a capital process
for Skeptic's strategy M n = 2Y n−1 and V n = 1. A n is the compensator for Y 2 n . Then by Lemma 4.6 and Lemma 4.7 of [24] , Skeptic can force that Y n converges.
(⇐) Although the argument for this implication is essentially the same as the first part, we can not directly apply Lemma 4.6 of [24] . We prove this implication by Proposition 2.1. Consider Skeptic's strategy
which is the negative of the above strategy. The capital process of P 0 is given as
P0 of Proposition 2.1 for this strategy is the set of paths such that {Y n } is bounded. Therefore by a multi-dimensional version of Proposition 2.1, Skeptic can force
By assumption Y n converges. Then {Y n } is bounded. Also Y 2 n converges. Furthermore since A n is non-decreasing, the second case of the right-hand side of (8) is impossible. Therefore Skeptic can force the event:
In Theorem 3.1 we considered the convergence of the series n (x n − m n ). In standard measure-theoretic probability theory, in the bounded case, the series is split as n (x n − m n ) = n x n − n m n . Then the convergence of n x n is discussed in terms of convergence of n m n and n v n . Two-series theorem (see e.g. [27] ) says that, under the assumption of independence, n x n converges if and only if n v n converges and n m n converges. However, without the assumption of independence, the case where n m n does not converge and n v n = ∞, is very subtle. Indeed, Gilat [7] showed a counter example which implies that there exists no condition on the conditional expectations and conditional variances of a series of uniformly bounded random variables which is necessary and sufficient for the sum to converge almost surely. We give a game-theoretic version of Gilat's result.
Theorem 3.2. In BFQH there is no set D of infinite sequences of Forecaster's moves such that Skeptic can force
First we explain the intuition behind the proof. The following is Gilat's example. Let {Z n } be the sequence of independent random variables with
and Z 0 = 0. Then Z n → 0 and n Z n does not converge almost surely. Let X n = Z n − Z n−1 and Y n = −Z n − Z n−1 for n ≥ 1. Then the conditional means and the conditional variances of X n are the same as those of Y n . Furthermore
We want to show that a strategy forcing (9) yields a contradiction. Intuitively, if Skeptic can force an event E, then a "typical" or "random" sequence should satisfy E. Pick up a typical realization {η n } of {Z n }. Then η n → 0 and n η n does not converge. The sequence {x n } = {η n − η n−1 } is also typical for {X n }. Then
This is a contradiction. Since Forecaster knows the previous moves of Reality, the first randomness does not imply the second and third randomness in game-theoretic probability. Hence we construct three strategies and pick up a random sequence for the strategies.
Proof. Assume that there exists a set D and a (prudent) strategy Q by which Skeptic can force that
We prove that this assumption yields a contradiction. Also fix a (prudent) strategy P of Skeptic that forces
Such a strategy exists by Theorem 3.1. Let a ∈ N be a positive constant large enough to satisfy 0 < (a − 1)
We construct two strategies Q 1 and Q 2 for Skeptic from Q. At round n, Skeptic by Q announces M Q n and V Q n . These values depend on the moves of Forecaster and Reality until the previous round and the moves of Forecaster at the current round. So we write
where η 0 = 0 and |η n | = ω 1/2 n . The sign of η n will be defined below in (12) . Since the sign of η n is not defined yet, Q 1 and Q 2 are not defined yet. However, we have
. The strategies of Q 1 and Q 2 are explained as follows. Q 1 moves as Q moves when Forecaster's moves are specified as
and Reality announces η n − η n−1 . Similarly Q 2 moves as Q when m n = −η n−1 , v n = ω n and Reality announces −η n −η n−1 with the minus sign in the definition of M Q2 n . Define a Skeptic's strategy T by T = (P + Q 1 + Q 2 )/3 and define (the sign of) η n , n ≥ 1, by
We claim that (for a given P) T and η n are defined by mutual induction. Note that η 0 is already defined as 0. At round n, η k has been defined for each k < n. Then M Q1 n and M Q2 n are defined. Hence M T n is defined. It follows that η n is defined. By induction T and η n are defined.
The capital process K n is completely determined by strategies for Forecaster, Skeptic and Reality. By K F ,S,R n we denote the capital at round n when Forecaster uses the strategy F , Skeptic S and Reality R. In this proof we use the following strategies for Forecaster:
and for Reality:
Case I. Consider the case that Forecaster uses the strategy F 1 , Skeptic uses T , and Reality uses R 1 . Consider the capital K
F1,T ,R1 n
. By the definition of η n in (12), M T n η n ≤ 0 and η 2 n − ω n = 0 for all n. Hence K
for all n and K F1,T ,R1 n is monotone non-increasing in this case. Then
We will prove
for all n. Then by prudence of P and Q, the three capitals K
are all non-negative. Hence they are bounded by (13) . When Forecaster uses F 1 , n m n = 0 and n v n = ∞. By the property (11) of P and the boundedness of K F1,P,R1 n , n (η n − m n ) = n η n does not converge. Note that η n converges to 0. Case II. Consider the case that Forecaster uses F 2 , Skeptic Q and Reality R 2 . In this case
hence it converges. By the property (10) of Q and the boundedness of K
Case III. Consider the case that Forecaster uses F 2 , Skeptic Q and Reality R 3 . In this case
hence it does not converge. Similarly, by the property (10) of Q and the boundedness of K F2,Q,R3 n , we have (−η 0 , ω 1 , −η 1 , ω 2 , . . .) ∈ D. This is a contradiction. It remains to show the equations (14) , that is,
for all n. We prove this by induction. For n = 0, we have K
This completes the proof.
Therefore we are interested in when we can determine the convergence of n x n by n m n and n v n , and when we can not. From Theorem 3.1 combined with Proposition 2.2, we can easily prove the following relations.
Corollary 3.3. In BFQH Skeptic can force the following events:
n m n converges and n v n < ∞ ⇒ n x n converges, (ii) n m n does not converge and n v n < ∞ ⇒ n x n does not converge, (iii) n m n converges and n v n = ∞ ⇒ n x n does not converge. (iv) n x n converges ⇒ ( n m n converges and n v n < ∞) or
(i) and (ii) follow from (⇒) of Theorem 3.1, (iii) follows from (⇐) of Theorem 3.1 and (iv) follows from the fact that if Skeptic can force an event E in the bounded forecasting game, then he can force E in BFQH.
In the classical three-series theorem, the second case of the right-hand side of (15) is eliminated by the assumption of independence of the random variables. In view of Gilat's counter example, it seems that a simple general statement for the game-theoretic framework can not be given for this case. However in some special cases, where the behaviors of n m n and n v n are simple, we can give definite statements. In Corollary 3.4 and Corollary 3.5 we discuss such cases.
One simple case is that Reality's move x n is restricted to be non-negative. This corollary easily follows because by coherence m n ≥ 0 and and n m n is a non-negative series, which eliminates the second case on the right-hand side of (4).
We now consider the case that the move space of Reality is restricted to be a set of three points (trinomial game, cf. [18] ). This case will play an essential role in Section 4.3. Indeed the counter examples to SLLN in Section 4.3 of [24] and Section 7 of [13] are constructed as probability distributions on a set of three points. 
Then Skeptic can force n v n < ∞ ⇐⇒ x n = 0 for all but finite n.
Proof. This follows from Theorem 3.1 because for x n ∈ {0, ±1}, n x n converges if and only if x n = 0 for all but finite n.
For the rest of this section we again consider the coherence of BFQH mentioned just after Theorem 3.1 in relation to Corollary 3.5. The coherence can also be proved by a direct calculation as follows. If V n ≥ 0 then Reality announces
If V n < 0 and m n ≤ Mn 2Vn then Reality announces x n = C. The calculation is the same as above. This fact is important for our argument in Section 4.3, so we state it as a proposition. Proposition 3.6. BFQH remains coherent even with the restriction x n ∈ {m n , ±C}.
The rate of convergence of SLLN
In this section we consider the rate of convergence of SLLN in the usual unbounded forecasting game with quadratic hedge.
Unbounded Forecasting
Players: Forecaster, Skeptic, Reality Protocol:
Forecaster announces m n ∈ R and v n > 0. Skeptic announces M n ∈ R and V n ≥ 0. Reality announces x n ∈ R.
As in the last section we use the notation Y n = n k=1 (x k − m k ), A n = n k=1 v k and A ∞ = lim n A n . In many cases we assume that m n = 0 for all n without loss of generality.
Motivation
The rate of convergence of SLLN for i.i.d. case was completely solved by LIL of Hartman and Wintner [9] . We refer to [23] . Theorem 4.1 (Hartman-Wintner's law of the iterated logarithm). Let {X n } be a sequence of independent identically distributed random variables with zero mean and finite variance σ 2 . We put S n = n k=1 X k , a n = (2n log log n) 1/2 . Then lim sup S n /a n = σ a.s., lim inf S n /a n = −σ a.s.
The theorem was a generalization of the case of binary sequences by Khinchin [11] . If we drop the condition of i.i.d., we need some additional conditions. 
Some other condition for LIL than in Theorem 4.2 is given in [29] and LIL for martingales are discussed for example in [28] and [5] . For game-theoretic LIL see Chapter 5 of [24] and a recent paper by Takazawa [25] .
In game-theoretic probability we can not assume that the sequence {x n } announced by Reality is i.i.d. Furthermore we can not assume the existence of M n either such that |x n | ≤ M n . From now on we consider the rate of convergence of SLLN in game-theoretic probability. In the view point of measure-theoretic probability it is the rate of convergence of SLLN in a non-identical case.
Results on convergences in unbounded forecasting
Here we derive several results on the rate of convergence of Kronecker's lemma and hence the strong law of large numbers.
Lemma 4.3. In the unbounded forecasting Skeptic can force
n v n < ∞ ⇒ n k=1 (x k − m k ) converges.
Skeptic can not force
Proof. The proof of the first statement is exactly the same as the proof of (⇒) in Theorem 3.1. For the second statement, consider Reality's strategy x n = m n , ∀n. Then K n = K 0 − n k=1 V k v k and clearly Skeptic has no control over v n 's and hence can not achieve n v n < ∞.
Theorem 4.4. Let g be a positive increasing function. In the unbounded forecasting Skeptic can force
Proof. We assume that m n = 0 for all n without loss of generality. We consider the capital process
The compensator of W 2 is
If B ∞ < ∞, then W n converges by Lemma 4.6 and Lemma 4.7 in [24] . 
Proof. This follows easily from Theorem 4.4 and Kronecker's lemma.
In some cases we can drop n v n /g(A n ) < ∞ from (17) . The following is an example.
Corollary 4.6. Let g be a positive increasing function such that
dx < ∞.
Then Skeptic can force
Proof. It suffices to show that n v n /g(A n ) < ∞ when A ∞ = ∞. This holds because
Example 4.7. We write ln i to mean the function such that ln i (x) = ln(ln i−1 (x)) and ln 0 (x) = x defined recursively. Let
In other words,
Hence Skeptic can force
For example, consider the special case v n ≡ v. Then A ∞ = ∞ is automatic and with g 2 (x) above we have k≤n 
Note that it does not follow k≤n (x k − m k )/ √ n ln n ln ln n → 0. This is because n 1 n ln n ln ln n = ∞. However this does not mean that Theorem 4.4 is a weaker result compared to LIL. Recall that we are considering a non-identical case in the measure-theoretic point of view. In fact Theorem 4.4 is strict as we will see in the next subsection.
We now apply Corollary 4.5 to the coin-tossing game. We first show that the coin-tossing game is a special case of BFQH. Restrict x n ∈ {0, 1},
For both x = 0 and x = 1 we have (x−p)
By considering Skeptic's move M n + V n (1 − 2p n ), we see that BFQH for x n ∈ {0, 1} reduces to the coin-tossing game. Therefore from Corollary 4.6 applied to the coin-tossing game, we have the following result.
Proposition 4.8. Let g be a positive increasing function such that
∞ 0 1 g(x) dx < ∞. LetĀ n = n k=1 p k .
Then in the coin-tossing game Skeptic can forcē
On the other hand, if A ∞ <Ā ∞ = ∞, then Skeptic can force the convergence of n (x n − p n ). However in this case
Note that Proposition 4.8 strengthens (ii) of Remark 2.5, which only states
Results on divergence in unbounded forecasting
As the converse to the convergence result in the previous subsection, we will prove that Skeptic can not force the convergence on the right-hand side of (16) when n v n /g(A n ) = ∞. The novelty in our approach is that in order to prove this fact we use deterministic strategies of Reality. We formulate Reality's strategies and introduce the notion of compliance of Reality with an event. We propose to use the term "compliance" for Reality's strategies and reserve the word "forcing" to Skeptic for clarity of our arguments. Skeptic's forcing an event E means that Reality has to move so that E happens in order that Skeptic's capital stays bounded. In contrast Reality's forcing an event E means intuitively that Reality can move so that E happens and Skeptic's capital stays bounded irrespective of the moves of Forecaster and Skeptic. In other words Reality conforms to E and adapts as requested.
For notational simplicity, as in the multi-dimensional bounded forecasting game, write µ n = (m n , v n ), m n = (M n , V n ). Consider Reality's strategy R = {R n } n≥1 which determines Reality's move x n based on the moves µ k , m k , k ≤ n, of Forecaster and Skeptic: 
and
(ii) sup n K n < ∞. The idea of the proof is as follows. First of all Reality needs to prevent the capital from tending to infinity. By coherence this is possible for Reality. Next the path must be in E. Since Skeptic can force E, Skeptic has the strategy such that if the path is not in E, then the capital goes to infinity. It follows that if the capital does not tend to infinity, then the path is in E. Then all Reality has to do is to prevent the capital of the strategy from tending to infinity. Again by coherence this is possible for Reality. Can Reality prevent the capitals of two strategies from tending to infinity? It is possible by considering the strategy that is the average of two strategies. In other words Reality's strategy can be constructed by considering a single sufficiently powerful strategy of Skeptic. Furthermore Reality's strategy can be deterministic. To make the strategy "strongly" comply we need a more precise argument as is in the proof.
We say that by R Reality strongly complies with E if the supremum in (ii
Such an argument is commonly used in algorithmic randomness. Especially some examples of random sets are sets on which a single sufficiently powerful (super)martingale fails. See [19, 6, 16, 20, 17] . One way to obtain a set on which the (super)martingale fails is to choose the leftmost non-ascending path in binary sequences. This choice corresponds to the coherence in game-theoretic probability. Although the constructed random sets may not be computable in general, it can be constructed deterministically by the (super)martingale.
We set up some more notation for clarity. When the moves of all the players are individually specified we write Skeptic's capital as
In this notation Skeptic's capital under a strategy P is written as
We now give a proof of Proposition 4.10.
Proof. Since Skeptic can force E, there exists Skeptic's strategy P such that lim sup
First we give a strategy R of Reality such that K n is uniformly bounded from above by 1 + ǫ, where ǫ > 0 is arbitrarily fixed. Consider Reality's move at the first round n = 1 after Forecaster's move µ 1 = (m 1 , v 1 ) and Reality's move m 1 = (M 1 , V 1 ) were announced. Write P 1 (µ 1 ) = P 1 ((m 1 , v 1 
, which is the move of the strategy P at the first round. Let α = 1/(1 + ǫ) and let
Because of coherence, Reality can (deterministically) choose x 1 such that
We now make an inductive argument. Suppose that Reality could deterministically choose x 1 , . . . , x n−1 such that
As in the first round definẽ
where (M n , V n ) = m n is the actual move announced by Skeptic and (M P n , V P n ) is the move of strategy P. By coherence, Reality can now choose x n such that
Thus as in the first round
By (18) and the first term of (20), (i) of Definition 4.9 is satisfied. By the second term of (20) ,
] is uniformly bounded from above by 1 + ǫ. It remains to show that we can let ǫ = 0. We argue as follows. By coherence, Reality can always choose x n such that M n (x n −m n )+V n ((x n −m n ) 2 −v n ) ≤ 0. In the unbounded forecasting, unless (M n , V n ) = (0, 0), Reality can choose x n such that this inequality is strict. Reality will look for the first time n = n 0 such that (M n , V n ) = (0, 0). At round n 0 Reality chooses x n0 such that
k=1 ] and after the round n 0 Reality follows the strategy ensuring K n ≤ 1, n > n 0 , as in (19) . On the other hand, if there is no such n 0 , then Reality keeps choosing x n such that K
n k=1 ] = 1 for all n and also (i) of Definition 4.9 is satisfied by (18) .
We now state the following theorem. 
As an immediate consequence of this theorem we have the following corollary.
Corollary 4.13. Let g : R → R be a positive increasing function. Let E 1 be any event depending only on
In the unbounded forecasting Skeptic can not force
For proving Theorem 4.12 we prove two technical lemmas.
Lemma 4.14. Let {y n } be a sequence of reals and let {g n } be a non-decreasing sequence of positive reals. If ( k≤n y k )/g n converges to d, then |y n /g n | ≤ |d|+1 for all but finite n.
Proof. First note that
Therefore it suffices to show that
for all sufficiently large n.
Let ǫ be such that 0 < ǫ ≤ 
It follows that, for all n − 1 > N , 
(ii) ǫ n a n ≤ 1, (iii) n a n = ∞ implies n ǫ n a n = ∞ and ǫ n → 0.
Proof. We define ǫ n as follows.
(P1) Let n = b = c = 1.
(P2) If 2 −b a n ≥ 1 then let ǫ n = 1/a n , otherwise ǫ n = 2 −b , i.e. let ǫ n = min(1/a n , 2 −b ). It is clear that (i) and (ii) are satisfied. We shall prove that (iii) is satisfied. Suppose that n a n = ∞.
We claim that n k=c ǫ k a k ≥ 1 in (P3) for infinitely many times. Otherwise, b and c do not change from some point. Also, in view of
ǫ n = 2 −b for all but finite n. It follows that k≥c 2 −b a k < 1. This contradicts to the fact that n a n = ∞.
Then there exists an increasing sequence {c i } such that ci+1 k=ci+1 ǫ k a k ≥ 1. It follows that n ǫ n a n = ∞.
Since b goes to infinity and ǫ n ≤ 2 −b in (P2), we have ǫ n → 0.
We are now ready to give a proof of Theorem 4.12. Before starting a formal proof, we discuss the idea of the proof. By Proposition 4.10 we wish Skeptic could force the divergence. As we saw in the Lemma 4.3, however, it is not easy for Skeptic to force the divergence in the unbounded forecasting. So we use the bounded forecasting, more precisely, the game restricted to three points as in Proposition 3.6.
It is suffices to show that Skeptic can force (21) in the restricted protocol by the following reason. Consider the following three statements.
(i) Skeptic can force the event in the restricted protocol.
(ii) Reality strongly complies with the event in the restricted protocol.
(iii) Reality strongly complies with the event in the unbounded forecasting.
The implication (ii)⇒(iii) holds by the following simple argument. Suppose that Reality strongly complies with it in the restricted protocol. Then Reality can use the same strategy in the unrestricted protocol or in the unbounded forecasting.
The implication (i)⇒(ii) follows from Proposition 4.10. Note that the restricted protocol Skeptic can use a strategy with V n ≤ 0 in order to force (21) . In the unrestricted protocol this is not allowed. It is Reality who refers this Skeptic's strategy to make her strategy.
To prove (i), we use the trinomial game (cf. Corollary 3.5 and Proposition 3.6). In other words we construct a reduction from the restricted protocol to the trinomial game. Then since Skeptic can force the divergence in the trinomial game, Skeptic can also force the divergence in the restricted protocol. This argument of the reduction is often seen in computability theory [21, 22] , complexity theory [1] and algorithmic randomness [4, 19] .
We now give a formal proof.
Proof of Theorem 4.12.
For notational simplicity we write y n = x n − m n , g n = g(A n ) and z n = y n /g n . Let ǫ n ≥ 0 be such that ǫ 2 n is a sequence of Lemma 4.15 for a n = vn g(An) . We restrict Reality's moves as ǫ n z n ∈ {0, ±1}. The capital process is
Then K n can be seen as a capital process in Corollary 3.5 where Forecaster announces m = ∞ ⇒ ǫ n z n = ±1 for infinitely many n and Reality can choose her move such that
By the definition of ǫ n we have n vn g(An) = ∞ ⇒ n ǫ 2 n vn g(An) = ∞. Furthermore If ǫ n |z n | = 1 for infinitely many n then |z n | = 1/ǫ n for infinitely many n and sup n |z n | = ∞ by ǫ 2 n → 0 and ǫ n → 0. It follows that ( k≤n y k )/g n does not converge by Lemma 4.14.
We can summarize the results of this section as follows. Consider a game in which Skeptic wins when
converges. If both players do the best, then the winner depends only on whether n vn g(An) < ∞ or not. In other words in order to make it converge we need a function g such that n vn g(An) < ∞. As we have already seen in Example 4.7 this g grows faster than n log log n that appears in LIL.
A measure-theoretic interpretation is as follows. Let m n and v n be the conditional mean and the conditional variance. Under any probability measure, if
converges a.s. Now consider the case n vn g(An) = ∞. There exists a probability measure, such that if n vn g(An) = ∞ then k≤n
does not converge a.s.
Rate of convergence of SLLN under a general hedge
Theorem 4.4 can be seen as an extension of SLLN. In contrast Kumon, Takemura and Takeuchi [13] proved another extension. Furthermore both extensions have similar forms. To clarify a relation between these two extensions we consider a protocol with a general hedge.
Unbounded Forecasting with General Hedge (UFGH)
Parameters: A single hedge h : R → R Players: Forecaster, Skeptic, Reality Protocol:
We assume a few conditions for h : R → R.
(A1) For some c > 0, h(x)/x is monotone increasing for x > c.
(A2) For some c > 0, h(x)/x 2 is monotone decreasing for x > c.
In (A2) we are considering hedges weaker than the quadratic hedge, which is our main interest in this section. The implications of hedges stronger than the quadratic hedge to the rate of SLLN are investigated by recent papers of Takazawa ( [26] , [25] ).
The case of convergence
The following theorem is a generalization of Theorem 4.4 to the general hedge. 
converges.
This corollary follows from the theorem and Kronecker's lemma. Notice that Theorem 5.1 with h(x) = x 2 implies Theorem 4.4. In contrast Theorem 5.1 with g(x) = h(x/ν), m n = 0 and v n = ν implies Theorem 3.1 of [13] .
The rest of this section is devoted to a proof of Theorem 5.1. The proof is just a straightforward combination of that of Theorem 4.4 and that of Theorem 3.1 of [13] . Note that, without loss of generality, we assume that m n = 0 for all n. 
otherwise.
Then h 0 satisfies (A1) and (A2) for x ≥ 0. It also follows that h −1 (y) ≥ 0 is defined for y ≥ 0.
By this remark we assume that c in (A1) and (A2) are 0. Let
1 (y). Then the convergence does not depend on the use of h and h 1 . We also have h(x)/x 2 ≤ 1.
Proof. Consider the strategies such that
as long as K n is non-negative for all x n where D is a natural number. If
If n v n /g(A n ) < ∞ and n h(x n )/g(A n ) = ∞, then lim n K n = ∞. This proves the lemma.
Lemma 5.5. Under the conditions (A0), In UFGH Skeptic can force
for only finitely many n.
Proof. Notice that
Then the result follows from Lemma 5.4.
Lemma 5.6. Under the conditions (A0) and (A2), In UFGH Skeptic can force
we have v n /g(A n ) ≤ 1 for all but finite n. Hence we can assume that the inequality in the right-side hand of (22) holds for all n. Then
Hence K ± n > 0 for all n. By the game-theoretic martingale convergence theorem, both K ± n converge to a non-negative finite value. By the inequality t ≥ log(1 + t) ≥ t − t 2 for all t ≥ −1/2,
Notice that each of the following infinite sums is finite;
By the inequality 
It follows that sup n n k=1 ±x n h −1 • g(A k ) < ∞.
Hence both log K ± n converge to a finite value. Therefore we obtain the desired result.
The case of divergence
We now consider the case of divergence of n v n /g(A n ). 
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 4.12. We will consider the protocol such that Reality's move is restricted for each n. We shall show that Skeptic can force (23) and Reality strongly complies with (23) in this protocol. Let y n = x n − m n , g n = h −1 • g(A n ) and z n = y n /g n . We restrict z n ∈ {0, ±1}. If |z n | = 1 then h(y n ) = h(g n ) = g(A n ). If z n = 0 then h(y n ) = h(0) = 0. In any cases we have h(y n ) = g(A n )z 2 n . The capital process is
.
By Corollary 3.5, Skeptic can force n v n g(A n ) = ∞ ⇒ |z n | = 1 for infinitely many n and Reality can choose x n such that K n ≤ K n−1 and hence sup n K n ≤ 1. If |z n | = 1 for infinitely many n, then n y n /g n does not converge. Hence Skeptic can force (23) .
We will show that
does not converge under the additional condition h(xy) = h(x)h(y) for all x, y ≥ 0. However this condition implies h(x) = x r and h −1 (x) = x 1/r for x ≥ 0. Taking into account of (A1)-(A2) we have 1 ≤ r ≤ 2. Proof. Let y n = x n − m n , g n = h −1 • g(A n ) and z n = y n /g n . This time let {ǫ n } be such that h(ǫ n ) is a sequence of Lemma 4.15 for vn g(An) . We can assume that 0 < ǫ n ≤ 1 for all n. We restrict ǫ n z n ∈ {0, ±1}. Then we have
Hence the capital process is
By Corollary 3.5, Skeptic can force n h(ǫ n ) v n g(A n ) = ∞ ⇒ ǫ n |z n | = 1 for infinitely many n and Reality can choose x n such that K n ≤ K n−1 and hence K n ≤ 1. The rest of the proof is the same as that of Theorem 4.12.
One may think that this result contradicts Marcinkiewicz-Zygmund strong law, which says that for i.i.d. random variables {x n } with E|x n | r < ∞ for 0 < r < 2 and Ex n = 0 when 1 ≤ r < 2, n −1/r ( n k=1 x k ) → 0 as n → ∞ a.s. For example let m n = 0, v n = v for all n and g(x) = x/v. Then g n = (g(A n )) 1/r = n 1/r and ǫ n z n = ǫ n y n /g n = ǫ n x n /n 1/r . By ǫ n z n ∈ {0, ±1} we have x n ∈ {0, ±n 1/r /ǫ n }. Since ǫ n → 0, we have n 1/r /ǫ n → ∞ as n → ∞. It follows that the restrictions of x n are not the same. Thus this is not a contradiction.
Theorem 5.1 and Theorem 5.9 give the rate of convergence of SLLN under a general hedge in a non-identical case.
Discussion
In the classical three-series theorem, under the assumption of independence of random variables, the necessary and sufficient condition for the convergence of a random series is given by the convergence of three series: truncation probabilities, truncated expected values and truncated variances. On the other-hand Gilat's counter example shows that the necessity of the convergence of three series can not hold for martingales. Therefore a question of interest is to specify some conditions, other than the independence, under which the convergence of a random series implies the convergence of three series. We have shown that under the convergence of a random series, the divergence of truncated means can only occur as two-sided unbounded oscillation. We also gave some simple conditions of convergences of truncated means and variances, but stronger results are desirable.
We proposed the notion of compliance concerning Reality's deterministic strategy. We showed that a good deterministic strategy of Reality can be automatically constructed by using a good strategy for Skeptic as a "surrogate". In Definition 4.9 we made a distinction between compliance and strong compliance concerning Reality's deterministic strategy. Further study is needed to clarify the difference between these definitions.
We gave the precise limit of the rate of convergence of SLLN with the quadratic hedge as well as more general weaker hedges. According to it the rate of convergence for a non-identical case may be slower than for the i.i.d. case. We believe that game-theoretic probability is a powerful tool for analysis of such a non-identical case.
